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Research Problem
• Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is a
critical part of a modern smart grid that performs
the bidirectional data flow of sensitive power
information such as smart metering data and
control commands.
• While smart meter data helps to improve the
overall performance of the grid in terms of
efficient energy management, it has also made
the AMI an attractive target of cyberattackers with
a goal of stealing energy.
• We propose a novel technique to detect
fraudulent data from smart meters based on
energy consumption patterns of the consumers
by utilizing deep learning techniques.
Threat Model
• Attackers in AMI: (1) Customers - Customers
have been the primary adversaries. (2)
Organized crime - Professional hackers exploit
the extended computing and network features.
(3) Utility company insiders - Dishonest or
disgruntled employees in the utility companies
may take part.
• Targets of Threats: (1) Smart meters - Smart
meters are the most attacked components in
the AMI. (2) Communications network: Usage
data may be tampered after recording or during
transmission. (3) Data collector: Data collectors
may have remote disconnect functions, which
can be exploited by attackers to create power
outages [3].
Anomaly Detection: Unsupervised Technique
• The dataset contains energy consumption of
users of different categories.
• We first create clusters of users with similar
consumption behavior.
• We run k−means algorithm on our dataset, which
provides us with such clusters based on time of
the day and the amount of electricity consumed.
• We run k−means for different values of k, and
choose the best one based on minimum sum of
squared distance of the data points from
corresponding centroids:
Dataset: Data Preprocessing
Anomaly Detection: Supervised Technique
• Within each cluster, we create a dataset for
training our supervised classifier.
• A ‘label’ attribute was introduced to the dataset,
which identifies whether a data record is malicious
or legitimate.
Challenge and Objective
• Smart meters have several vulnerabilities that
are exploited by cyberattackers to manipulate
the collected data [1], [2].
• One of the biggest challenges is the detection
and prevention of electricity energy theft.
• We propose a machine learning based
approach to address the problem, which is the
first of its kind to the best of our knowledge.
Suspicious Node Detection
• We assume that the smart meters are connected
with other meters in a mesh topology, where
intermediate nodes (meters) relay the data
collected by its child node to the upper level.
• If the intermediate nodes are compromised, they
can be used to alter the legitimate meter data to
launch an attack. Some malicious nodes may
deliberately perform attacks on some other nodes.
• The compromised or malicious nodes can alter
the meter data coming from other nodes. This is
performed through bypassing the integrity
protection schemes, if any.
• In our attack model, we consider two strategies of
a malicious node in the mesh AMI network: (1)
Changing any data going through itself. (2)
Changing selective data from particular nodes.
• We propose two different algorithms to detect the
malicious nodes in both the strategies.
Dataset: Data Collection
Results
• We collected the electricity consumption data
provided by the Irish Social Science Data
Archive Center.
• Each data record has three main attributes:
meter ID, date/time of collection, and the
energy consumption data in kW-h.
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We utilized the elbow method for choosing optimal
number of cluster. k = 5 was chosen.
• The date and time are not a continuous valued
attributes, rather they are categorical values,
which required one-hot encoding.
• We found any missing records corresponding
to any particular time, and used the average of
the preceding and succeeding record to fill in
the missing value.
• We consider the z−score of the consumption
value according to the formula x ← (x−µ)/σ so
that the variables possess approximately zero
mean, which in practice, reduces
computational cost while training the models.
Boxplot showing the anomalous data in one
of the clusters, which were labeled as
fraudulent.
ANN SVM K-NN Adaboost
Cluster C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2
TPR 0.98 0.94 0.67 0.93 0.98 0.88 0.98 0.91
FPR 0.000
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Precision 0.99 0.95 1 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.93
Recall 0.98 0.95 0.67 0.93 0.98 0.88 0.98 0.91
F1 0.99 0.94 0.8 0.96 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.92
Accuracy 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
A typical AMI infrastructure.
A mesh network of AMI, which has some
suspicious nodes detected by our machine
learning model (yellow). Their data reached
the aggregator through some intermediate
nodes (red), which may also be malicious, as
suggested by our algorithms.
• We trained the classifier based on a multi-layer
perceptron, and compared the results with
several other techniques.
• We ran the model for a maximum of 200
epochs or until convergence, where in each
epoch, the input samples are shuffled.
• We used the day, time, and the consumption
value to learn a general pattern for the
consumption.
A comparison of performance between ANN
and other supervised techniques. The results
are shown for two of the five clusters found
from the unsupervised technique.
